4-Page Special: A Study in Successful Brain Washing

Insurrection? But Johnson and Rusk Say We're Just Repelling An Invasion

"To exert pressure on the Government of North Vietnam to cease its direction and support of the insurrection in South Vietnam."

—Secretary McNamara, explaining our military objectives to the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees Jan. 23 in a closed door hearing on the 1967 Vietnam supplemental war bill released Feb. 20, p. 11.

"Insurrection: Act or instance of revolt against civil or political authority, or the established government."

—Webster's Unabridged Dictionary

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The Fraud With Which Bomb Resumption Was Excused

The principal excuse for resuming the bombing of the North will turn out, when the full truth is available, to be a fraud. President Johnson said he had "no alternative but to resume full-scale hostilities" because North Vietnam had used the 4-day Tet truce for "major resupply efforts of their troops in South Vietnam" rather than to seek a peaceful settlement. In London Prime Minister Wilson went even further and told the House of Commons next day that "the massive southward movement of troops and supplies in the north . . . threatened to create a severe military unbalance." Neither Saigon nor Washington had claimed that troops as well as supplies had been moved south, much less that the movement was such as to create a "severe military unbalance." This would have been too silly an exaggeration for our military to venture. Even if we loaned McNamara and the Seventh fleet to Hanoi, it couldn't change the military balance of power in the South—in four days yet! Harold Wilson was the foremost victim—and the most far-out echo—of a U.S. propaganda campaign.

Orchestrated by Rusk

This campaign was initiated by Secretary Rusk at his press conference Feb. 9, the second day of the truce. He said "we have seen large numbers of boats and other vessels dashing south along the coast of North Vietnam to resupply their forces *in the southern part of North Vietnam* [our italics] and in the demilitarized zone." He declared this "indicates that it is their intention to continue the operation." Few stopped to notice that the Secretary did not say the supplies were crossing the 17th parallel. Nor did anyone ask whether supply was a violation of the truce, especially when it occurred on North Vietnam's own territory. The Secretary's remark that the North was resupplying troops in the DMZ was not true. Raymond R. Coffey of the *Chicago Daily News* Service cabled from Saigon next day that "for all the road, sea and air traffic sighted in the north, U.S. officials acknowledge that they still do not have any reports of men or materiel moving into the demilitarized zone of South Vietnam (sic). The farthest south any traffic has been sighted is around Dong Hoi, 20 miles or so [It's closer to 40—IFS], above the zone." * But for every reader who saw Coffey's dispatch there were millions who got the intended picture of the Communists crassly violating the truce to move massive supplies across the border. *Time,* for example, said (Feb. 17) that Hanoi used the truce "for reinforcement and replenishment of its troops below the 17th parallel. Army trucks rumbled down canopied jungle trails into South Vietnam and cargo vessels sped down the coast with impunity. . . ." Like an orchestra leader striking his baton, the Secretary of State had launched a theme that was to be repeated and amplified from Washington and Saigon to prepare the public mind for a resumption of the bombing.

The day after Rusk's press conference, State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey was asked whether supply ac-

(*Continued on Page Two*)

Even If North Vietnam Were Knocked Out

Sen. DOMINICK (R. Col): It is my understanding that the troops of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong who are operating in South Vietnam are not mechanized. They are largely foot, bullock cart, and things of that type; is that correct?

Secretary McNAMARA: That is correct.

Sen. DOMINICK: Could you tell me then what is the importance of the petroleum and oil supplies we are talking about to the fight of South Vietnam?

Secretary McNAMARA: Yes; the petroleum and oil supplies are used for military purposes, for example, to fuel the jets, but more importantly to fuel the trucks that are used to move supplies from the north. . . .

Sen. DOMINICK: You feel that to be enabled to cut this off, would have a significant effect on the continued fight in South Vietnam?

Secretary McNAMARA: No . . . (a) because they are not going to be effective in stopping the flow of petroleum, and (b) if they were, the enemy would move it by bicycles, and backpacks.

Sen. DOMINICK: If we could cut off the weaponry, the armament and petroleum reserve from North Vietnam, moving into South Vietnam would the South Vietnamese continue to have a war on their hands?

Secretary McNAMARA: . . . If we could cut off the flow of men and materiel from the North to the South, it is my belief that the South Vietnamese OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, DURING A PORTION OF WHICH THEY WOULD NEED OUR HELP [emphasis added], could stop the aggression against them.

—Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on the 1967 supplemental for Vietnam, released Feb. 20.

*** This passage was omitted from the dispatch as published in the Washington Post Feb. 11. A reader sent me a clipping from the Toronto Star Feb. 11 which ran the full dispatch.**

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tivities were a violation of the truce. He replied coyly that he did want to get into that "since I don't have sufficient information to specify what are violations and what are not violations in the technical sense." When one correspondent recalled that elements of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division "began to debark during either the Christmas or the New Year's truce this past time around" and asked whether that was a truce violation, McCloskey answered, "I can't say yes or no." Like Rusk, McCloskey created the impression that this was a violation without saying so explicitly since that would have been palpably untrue. It was not until the end of the truce that the AP ticker carried a story from Bob Gassaway in Saigon saying that both sides had "agreed only to refrain from staging offensive operations" but "retained the right to continue the movement of supplies." One has to be pretty gullible to believe that Rusk and McCloskey did not know this all the time.

A Strange Kind of "Normal"

According to the Coffey dispatch from Saigon we have already quoted, "while questioning North Vietnam's activity, U.S. military authorities also were trying to quietly ignore the U.S. movement of men and supplies that has continued all through the cease-fire." Coffey reported that the first full day of the truce "a new one-day record of 2,762 tons was set for cargo delivered by air to units in the field." He said the daily air force communique had in the past routinely listed *the volume of cargo and passengers carried.*" But the day after the Rusk press conference—the day the U.S. military in Saigon first issued its sensational charge that supply missions in the north were "five times the normal"—the figures on cargo and passengers carried were missing from the daily air force communique. "When asked for the figures and why they were missing," Coffey reported, "an Air Force officer said the top U.S. headquarters command had 'told us not to' release them." When Coffey finally got the figures "they showed that U.S. planes—not counting truck and ship movements at all—carried 7,042 tons of supplies and more than 17,000 men during the first three days of the cease-fire."

The most vivid glimpse of U.S. supply efforts was printed in *Le Monde* (Feb. 12-13) that week-end, it said:

While the American services report a considerable intensification of road, rail, river and coastal traffic in North Vietnam, press correspondents Friday were able to verify, on the road from Saigon to Tay-Ninh, that American supply missions had also been able to profit from the Tet truce to increase the resupply of troops in combat rations and munitions. Long files of trucks belonging to the military transport companies were stretched out along this Northwest road. They were protected by tanks and by helicopters flying along at treetop level. In the town of Tay-Ninh itself, huge trucks and tractors were hauling loads of shells for 105-mm and 155-mm cannons to American units established on the outskirts of the Vietcong's Zone C.

This did not appear in the U.S. press but R. W. Apple, Jr., cabled from Saigon Feb. 12 in the *New York Times* of the same date, that while U.S. briefing officers said resupply efforts in the North "called into question the good faith of the North Vietnamese high command" and "asserted that the allies had made no move to take advantage of the truce"—

If The Words Don't Mean What They Seem to Say Isn't An Honest Explanation Overdue?

Sen. YOUNG (R. N.D.)—As I recall, President Johnson said at the Manila Conference that we would be withdrawing from South Vietnam 6 months after a settlement was reached. Is that substantially correct?

Secretary McNamara: The Manila conference statement was very carefully worded, and it wasn't phrased exactly that way.

Sen. YOUNG: Let me ask a question that bears on this. [Deleted].

Secretary McNamara: [Deleted].

Senator YOUNG: [Deleted].

[Colloquy deleted].

—New Senate Armed Services Committee hearings.

"They ["the 7 nations gathered in Manila"] declared that allied forces are in the Republic of Viet-Nam because that country is the object of aggression and its Government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the north, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. These forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

—The Manila Declaration, Oct. 25

The Actual Text of MACV's Communique in Saigon on the North's Supply Activity

"According to military estimates during the 96-hour period of Feb. 8-11 Tet truce approximately 1570 vessels were sighted along the coast of North Vietnam between the 17th and 19th parallels. Approximately 970 vessels were observed moving south and 600 moving north. Observers spotted 2200 trucks (probably some duplicate counting) [paren in original] either being loaded along the Kien Giang and Song Giang rivers, 25 and 50 miles north of the demilitarized zone respectively, or moving south or west toward the DMZ or Mu Gia pass. Spotters reported that during the first 48 hours of truce, roads in Quang Binh province just north of the DMZ were crowded with trucks and that mouths of three rivers between Vinh and the DMZ were jammed with water craft. Vessel traffic slackened during the last two days of TET partly due to bad weather and also because North Vietnamese were undoubtedly dispersing or hiding their boats in anticipation or resumption of air strikes.

"The foregoing estimates were formulated on the basis of aerial observation of North Vietnam between the 17th and 19th parallels plus coverage of coastal areas by destroyers. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ESTIMATES OF VESSEL AND TRUCK TRAFFIC ARE ON THE HIGH SIDE DUE TO MULTIPLE COUNTING BY SPOTTERS. IT IS ALSO DIFFICULT TO ARRIVE AT FIRM TONNAGE FIGURES for the amount of supplies moved during TET. However, more shipping and trucking actually occurred in Southern North Vietnam during the single 96-hour period than in any previous one-month period. [Not surprising: any month would be a month of bombing—IFS.] The vessels and trucks had A CAPACITY TO TRANSPORT an estimated 25,000 tons of supplies and equipment to Southern Vietnam and the Laos panhandle. IF THE FIGURE OF 25,000 WAS ACTUALLY REACHED, it would be sufficient to supply a division for an estimated 250 days."

—MACV's communique Feb. 12 (emphasis added).

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Uncle Sam's Increased Activity Since 1961 As "Merchant of Death"

How We Forment Arms Races and Encourage Militarization Abroad

The U.S. has become the world's leading "Merchant of Death", as armament salesmen were called 30 years ago. A staff study, "Arms Sales and Foreign Policy", released last week by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, shows the drive to expand the export of weapons began with the return of the Democrats to power under Kennedy. In October of 1961 McNamara established an office pretentiously named the International Logistic Negotiations Agency. Its purpose was to boost military sales abroad. Its director Henry J. Kuss, was promoted in 1964 to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

An Arms Evangelist

Mr. Kuss is evangelical about his job. In a speech last October to the American Ordnance Association he suggested lyrically that shipping more arms abroad somehow was a way to eliminate international misunderstanding! He scolded American companies for "their tendency . . . to refrain from entering into the international arms market." He disclosed the Pentagon's interest when he said "From the military point of view we stand to lose all of the major international relationships paid for with grant aid money unless we can establish professional military relationships through the sales media." More plainly put, this means that as Congress begins to tighten the purse-strings of military aid, our military seek to circumvent this change in public policy by substituting cash sales. But arms sold for cash are as noxious as arms given free in formenting little wars and military dictatorships.

The staff report does not point all this up sharply. But the facts are there. Its conclusions do not always match them. It quotes a McNamara news conference two years ago on the importance of our arms exports and says "it is difficult to fault the objectives and logic" of the policy he outlined. But this objective and this logic are exactly what needs to be attacked. McNamara said one purpose was to get the developed nations, especially West Germany, to raise the level of their arms expenditures and the size of the armed forces. But is it to our interest in this way to set off races in conventional arms and to stimulate more militarism in countries like Germany where it proved so recently a menace to ourselves and the world?

How A Supposed Development Bank Develops Arms Races Instead

"The Eximbank (Export-Import Bank) has taken an active interest in the financing of military export sales only since 1963 when the Defense Department was given authority to insure credits. The Eximbank role is one of providing a service function for the Department of Defense and bringing to military sales on credit the advantages of the Bank's experience in the international credit field . . . In addition Eximbank makes so-called 'country-loans'. Such loans are the result of Eximbank establishing what amounts to an accounts receivable fund for the use of the Department of Defense in arranging loans to underdeveloped countries. THE EXIMBANK DOES NOT KNOW OR WANT TO KNOW WHERE THIS MONEY GOES. [Emphasis added]. The Department of Defense guarantees these funds through the military assistance account . . . The bank therefore avoids the problem of directly financing military sales to underdeveloped countries."

—Arms Sales and Foreign Policy: A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff study, released Jan. 30.

McNamara's other purpose, as he outlined it, was to gain influence among underdeveloped nations by giving or selling them more arms, and then use that influence to get them to spend less on arms and more on social improvement! This seems to set a new high in naivete.

McNamara's defense of arms transfers to poorer countries appears all the more specious in the light of what this report reveals about our "military assistance credit account" for arms sales to nations which cannot afford to pay cash. This began with a fund of $15 million in the Mutual Security Act of 1957. In 1961 the Democrats made this a permanent revolving fund. Through yearly appropriations, it has now grown to $300 million. In 1964 the Pentagon slipped a new gimmick into the law by allowing the funds to guarantee 100 percent of the credit extended for arms sales "while only obligating 25% of the amount from the credit account as a reserve against default." This automatically made it possible to arrange for $1,200,000,000 in credits with this $300,000,000 revolving fund. This triples the credits for arms sales to the poor.

Arms Cast Upon The Waters—Come Back in the Shape of Trouble For The Givers

"Let me take note in passing of the recurring argument that if we do not provide arms to a country it will get them from the Soviets or possibly China. This is another example of that curious obtuseness which excessive preoccupation with cold war strategy produces in otherwise excellent minds. It was Soviet tanks that surrounded Ben Bella's palace in Algiers when that Soviet-supported leader was thrown out. It was a Soviet and Chinese equipped army which deposed the Indonesian Communists, destroyed the Communist party in that ruthlessness on which one hates to dwell and which left Sukarno's vision of an Asian socialism in shambles. One can only conclude that those who worry about Soviet arms wish to keep the Russians out of trouble. This could be carrying friendship too far."

—J. K. Galbraith, foreign aid testimony, quoted in the Senate Foreign Relations new study of U.S. arms sales.

"The U.S. has insisted that the West Germans buy approximately $775 million in arms per year to offset the cost of maintaining U.S. troops there . . . The cost is rising . . . while West Germany's . . . ability to absorb such equipment is rapidly declining . . . West Germany is [selling] surplus military equipment of American origin . . . Total U.S. arms sales have now reached something over the $2 billion per year level—not including grant aid. The problem of the disposal of surplus military equipment is certain to grow with this increase in sales. The surplus arms of the industrial nations may provide the ingredients of an arms race in the underdeveloped regions of the world. It should also be noted that some of the arms used by Latin American guerrillas today were exported for the U.S.—for quite different reasons—yesterday."

—Same Senate Foreign Relations staff study.

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The Price We Will Pay At Home for the Cruelty We Do Abroad

(*Continued from Page One*)

Rowen on the financial page of the *Washington Post* (Jan. 29) estimated that if depreciation allowances are taken into account then the return on capital reached an all-time high in 1966 of 21 percent. Yet instead of an excess profits tax to meet the cost of the war and stem the threat of inflation Johnson proposes a surtax on everybody's income. Even his tax program is tailored to the comfort of the military-industrial complex.

The Truth From A Southern Democrat

It was left for a Southern Democratic Senator to tell the truth about this budget. Senator Ellender in a report to his constituents called attention to the fact that, aside from the Vietnamese war costs, the Defense Department was to get $50.4 billions in 1968 as compared to $47.5 billions in 1967. Like other Southern Democrats, Ellender supports cutbacks in the domestic programs but he said:

I cannot see, however, that the President can expect to cut back and reduce necessary domestic programs for the benefit of the people without expecting some reductions in the regular expenditures of the Defense Department. The truth of the matter is that in many important respects, the Congress and the nation are in the hands of the military. Add to this group the Department of State and you have a combination that calls the shots. The Admirals and the Generals, strongly backed by the Department of State, seem to have the ways and means of getting just about what they want, regardless of the monetary difficulties afflicting the nation. In contrast to the immensity of a $75.5 billion budget for the military, we need only take a glance at the budget estimates for the conservation and development of our natural resources. We find here a national commitment of only $3.5 billions. It is to the conservation of its land and water that the nation must look if we hope to remain strong and prosperous in the decades ahead, but our investment in this field will represent only a tiny portion of the huge sums to be expended by the military during fiscal 1968.

Billions for destruction, peanuts for improvement—this about sums up the Johnson budget. The President sends an eloquent message to Congress on air and water pollution; he warns that in 10 years we shall have lost the battle for pure air, but neither in the air nor the water pollution battle does he show any readiness to spend the kind of money necessary to win. A meeting of Mayors hears warnings from Cavanagh of Detroit that any further cuts in the poverty program could trigger rioting in the streets, but everywhere the poverty program is being cut down and Congress is likely to cut it down further. It is not that the nation hasn't wealth enough to fight the Vietnamese war and meet the growing social and environmental crisis at home. The fact is that the war provides a new excuse for domestic cutbacks to those forces which are hostile to the poverty program and see it only as raising the price of labor on the plantation and in the city. Even Roosevelt, with far greater gifts and far deeper commitment than Johnson, had to shelve reform once the conflict broke out abroad. The war shifts the internal balance of forces at home against fruitful social change. This is the price, this is the retribution, for the cruelty we impose with such complacency on a distant and helpless people. We will pay with decay at home for all that destruction our bombers rain down abroad.

Still Not Telling The Truth

"McNamara said losses of fighter and attack aircraft in Vietnam in Calendar 1966 totalled 500. The Defense Department had estimated these losses at 534 at the beginning of the year. Combat losses through 1966 totalled 854 aircraft, including 463 over North Vietnam."

—Aviation Week *on the new budget, Jan. 30.*

"Saigon, Jan. 30 (UPI)—U.S. military officials disclosed today that American aircraft losses in the Vietnam war have been greater than reported in the past. The disclosure left the actual cost of the U.S. air war in doubt . . . (In Washington the Pentagon said the total number of planes lost in the war was 'classified') . . . The North Vietnamese government has repeatedly claimed that U.S. aircraft losses far exceeded the number given by U.S. officials."

—*Washington* Daily News, *Jan. 30.*

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